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On February 13, 2016 26-year-old Service de Police de Lac Simon Québec Constable 
Thierry Leroux was shot and killed as he and another officer responded to a domestic 
disturbance call at approximately 10:30 pm.
A male subject inside  the home opened fire  on the two officers 
as they approached the house. Constable Leroux was struck by 
the shot. He was transported to a hospital where he succumbed 
to the wound.
The subject who fired the shot committed suicide inside the 
home.
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IN MEMORIAM
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
???????????	 ????	 ??????	 ????	 ????
Policing  a democracy is no easy task. The rule of law is a 
bedrock principle and the police must respect the limits of the 
authority  they are granted. There are many sophisticated 
nuances in applying  and enforcing  the law and ultimately 
decision making  requires sound judgment, often in an 
atmosphere of violence with little  time for reflection. When 
those split second decisions are made, there is no benefit of 
hindsight and often no opportunity for a second opinion, 
academic reflection, or peer review.
The police make decisions every day that require careful and 
prudent deliberation. These decisions impact people’s lives, in 
some cases forever. Errors can be costly. When the cops screw 
up, cases, careers, and even lives can be at stake. There is an old 
saying  that, “Doctors bury  their mistakes while lawyers send 
theirs to prison. Police officers do a little  of both.” As 
professionals, the police owe it to themselves, their families, 
their organizations, and their communities to pursue a path of 
continuous learning  that keeps pace with today’s demands. In 
Service: 10-8 continues to be a proud leader in bringing  legal 
information to the attention of those serving on the front line.
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Highlights In This Issue
What’s New For Police In The Library 3
Using Flashlight To Scan Inside Vehicle Was Not A 
Charter Search
5
Officer’s Request To Come To Police Car For ID 
Purpose Reasonable
8
Police Did Not Create Exigencies: Warrantless Entry 
Lawful
10
No Privacy Interest In SDM: Vehicle Lawfully Seized 15
Appeal Court Split On Whether Detention 
Occurred
17
No Positive Duty On Police To Ensure Detainee 
Spoke To Counsel
21
Exceeding 24-Hour Delay In Presenting Before 
Justice Not Necessarily Arbitrary
25
Nightclub Staff Not Acting As Police Agents When 
Detaining Assault Suspect
27
Accused Not Detained In Hospital: s. 10(b) Warning 
Not Required
29
Psychological Detention Without s. 10(b) Warning 
Breached Charter
31
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
????????	 ??????	 ????????
Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
????	 ??????	 ???????
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
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March 1, 2016: 9 am - 3 pm
CFB Esquimalt, BC
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The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Bulletproof spirit: the first responder's essential 
resource for protecting  and healing  mind and 
heart. 
Captain Dan Willis, La Mesa Police Department.
Novato, CA: New World Library, 2014.
RA 785 W533 2014
Change management: a guide to effective 
implementation.
Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2016.
HD 58.8 M33 2016
The eighty-year rule:  what would you regret not 
doing in your lifetime?
Claire Yeung.
Bloomington, IN: Iuniverse Inc., 2015.
BF 637 S4 Y48 2015
The influential project manager: winning over 
team members and stakeholders.
Alfonso Bucero.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015.
HD 69 P75 B776 2015
The like switch: an ex-FBI agent's guide to 
influencing, attracting, and winning people over.
Jack Schafer, Ph.D., with Marvin Karlins, Ph.D.
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2015.
BF 575 F66 S33 2015
Managing  the unexpected: sustained performance 
in a complex world.
Karl E. Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015.
HD 49 W45 2015
Mindful  management:  the neuroscience of trust 
and effective workplace leadership.
Dalton A. Kehoe.
Richmond Hill, ON: Communicate for Life, Ltd., 
2015.
HD 57.7 K44 2015
The new one minute manager.
Ken Blanchard, PhD, Spencer Johnson, MD.
New York, NY: William Morrow, an imprint of 
Harper Collins Publishers, 2015.
HD 31.2 B53 2015
Not everyone gets a trophy: how to manage the 
millenials.
Bruce Tulgan.
Hoboken, NJ: Jossey-Bass, 2016.
HF 5549.5 M63 T854 2016
Resilience: how to cope when everything around 
you keeps changing.
Liggy Webb.
Chichester: Capstone, 2013.
BF 698.35 R47 W43 2013
Resilience: why things bounce back.
Andrew Zolli & Ann Marie Healy.
New York, NY: Free Press, 2012.
TA 169 Z65 2012
The resilience dividend: being  strong in a world 
where things go wrong.
Judith Rodin.
New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2014.
BF 698.35 R47 R63 2014
The Sage handbook of action research.
edited by Hilary Bradbury.
Los Angeles, CA: Sage Reference, 2015.
HM 571 H36 2015
The right decision:  evidence-based decision 
making for government professionals.
Paul S. Maxim, Len Garis, Darryl Plecas, and Mona 
Davies.
Abbotsford, BC: School of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, University of the Fraser Valley, 2015.
JF 1525 D4 M39 2015
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R. v. Diamond, 2015 NLCA 60
 
A police officer stopped a pick-up 
truck on a remote road at 12:55 am 
for travelling  80 km/h in a  50 km/h 
zone.  He radioed in the licence 
number and was advised to be 
cautious because the registered owner had been 
arrested for drugs before, and had a scanner and a 
knife. As the officer approached the vehicle, he saw 
a police scanner above the driver-side  window visor 
and noted the truck body was higher than usual. It 
had large tires and a suspension lift. When asked for 
his driver’s license and registration, the accused 
checked his window visor but could not find it. The 
officer then requested that the glove box be 
checked. When the accused leaned towards the 
glove box, the officer saw some money the accused 
had been sitting on.
With at least part of his head and hand through the 
open window, the officer shone his flashlight on “an 
unsheathed hunting  type knife” next to the driver’s 
side door. The knife was within the accused’s reach 
when seated. The accused was arrested for 
possessing  a weapon dangerous to the public peace 
and he was placed in handcuffs.  He was patted-
down at the roadside and a small bag  of cocaine  fell 
from his clothing.  He was advised of his right to 
counsel, which he declined, and was given the 
standard police caution. A subsequent strip-search at 
the police station led to the discovery of an 
additional 28 small bags of cocaine totaling  12 
grams. 
Newfoundland Provincial Court
The accused argued that his rights under 
ss. 8 and 9 of the  Charter were breached. 
In his view, the act of the officer leaning 
his head in the truck and shining  his 
flashlight constituted a warrantless search without 
sufficient grounds to do so. He submitted the 
officer’s conduct was “quite egregious” and a “ruse”. 
  
The judge, however, found the initial stop was not a 
ruse to justify a drug  or weapon search. The accused 
was driving  30 km/h over the speed limit. Dispatch 
told him to exercise caution. As an officer working 
alone, in the dark, and told to be cautious, he 
needed to take a reasonably thorough view of the 
vehicle. “Police work is a dangerous job, particularly 
when one is unaccompanied in the dead of night,” 
said the judge. “Vehicles are capable of transporting 
weapons, armaments and contraband.” Although the 
accused had an expectation of privacy while 
operating  his vehicle, it was a reduced one, and the 
officer’s inspection of the truck’s cab  did not amount 
to a search. The judge stated:
Where speed is a factor, the officer must be 
attentive to the possibility of impairment by 
alcohol or drugs. Where one is alerted to the 
possibility of the presence of a knife, one might 
also be expected to rotate one’s flashlight around 
to check the environment. This was not an open 
convertible or sports car which the officer could 
survey from above.   In order to view the vehicle 
in a proper manner to address the concern of 
impairment or personal safety around the 
possible presence of a weapon, the skills of a 
gymnast were not needed.  Nonetheless, the 
height of the vehicle required the head of the 
officer and the flashlight to minimally enter the 
open window area and the knife was seen 
immediately.
The knife was in plain view and seeing  it was 
inadvertent. “The officer did not expect to find a 
knife,” said the judge. “All the officer did was a 
routine scan of the vehicle with his flashlight as he 
had to do in that place and that circumstance and 
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the physical dimensions of the vehicle required a 
minimal insertion of head, hand and flashlight far 
enough through the open window to allow a view of 
this large knife, unsheathed and available for ready 
use in the lower door compartment on the driver’s 
side of the truck.” The  judge found the officer had 
the necessary reasonable grounds to justify an arrest 
under s. 495(1)  of the Criminal Code for possessing  a 
weapon for a purpose  dangerous to the public 
peace. The searches incidental to the arrest that 
uncovered the cocaine were therefore reasonable. 
The accused was convicted of unlawfully possessing 
a weapon dangerous to the public peace and 
unlawful possession of cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
  
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions by contending  that 
the trial judge erred in finding 
that the  officer’s inspection of 
the cab was not a  search. He argued that the  officer 
did more than a simple  visual inspection. Rather he 
performed a search when he physically  placed part 
of his head and hand while holding  a flashlight 
inside the truck’s interior. He also submitted that the 
discovery of the knife alone was insufficient to justify 
the arrest. Therefore, the pat-down and strip  searches 
that revealed the cocaine were unreasonable. In his 
opinion, all of the evidence should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
Search
Justice Harington, speaking  for the  majority, noted 
that “there  is a significant amount of jurisprudence 
affirming  that a police officer may use a flashlight at 
night to observe activities or objects inside vehicles.” 
He then concluded that the officer’s visual 
inspection of the cab’s interior in this case did not 
amount to a search: 
The judge found that the officer minimally 
inserted his head and a hand holding  a flashlight 
inside the vehicle only briefly, to assess his 
immediate surroundings for his own safety. This 
minimal intrusion was necessary due to the 
height of the truck.  I agree with his finding  that 
this did not constitute a search. [para. 18]
His visual inspection of the truck was lawful. As 
well, the plain view doctrine  applied. The officer 
was in a lawful position from which to view the 
unsheathed knife. 
Arrest
The majority of the Court of Appeal also agreed that 
the accused’s arrest was lawful. The officer had not 
only  the required subjective belief (as conceded by 
the accused) but it was also objectively reasonable 
in the circumstances. The total i ty  of the 
circumstances not only included the  presence of the 
knife but also the following:  
(i) The knife was located on the driver’s side, 
where it would be most easily 
accessible;
(ii) It was unsheathed. If the knife was 
related to illegal drug activity, it 
would be advantageous to have it 
unsheathed for quicker access;
(iii) Involvement in the drug trade can 
be a motive to carry a weapon for 
a purpose dangerous to the 
public;
(iv) The officer knew the [accused] 
had previously been arrested for 
possession of drugs;
(v) The [accused] was carrying  a 
machete type knife when he was 
last arrested for possession of 
drugs;
(vi) The [accused’s] vehicle was 
carrying a police scanner. That is a 
known drug-trafficking accessory; 
and
(vii) The [accused] was carrying  a 
police scanner the last time he 
was arrested for possession of 
drugs. [para. 25]
“There is a significant amount of 
jurisprudence affirming that a police 
officer may use a flashlight at night to 
observe activities or objects inside 
vehicles.”
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The majority, however, did offer this caution:
In reaching this conclusion, I am not suggesting 
that, in every instance when an unsheathed knife 
is located in a door pocket beside the driver of a 
vehicle, this would be the basis for arresting  the 
driver for possession of a weapon dangerous to 
the public peace. It is the confluence of 
circumstances that supports the arrest for that 
offence in this case.  The officer had been 
warned to proceed with caution since the owner 
of the vehicle had previously been charged with 
drug offences and, at the time, he had had a 
knife.  The officer was alone on a rural road at 
12:55 a.m.  The officer saw that the [accused] 
had been sitting on an amount of money which 
was visible when he leaned over to open the 
glove box.  In the circumstances, he reasonably 
suspected the involvement of drugs which 
alerted him to the possibility that the knife was 
intended for a use dangerous to the public 
peace, including to himself. [para. 21]
Since the arrest was lawful, the seizure of the 
cocaine was justifiable incidental to the accused’s 
arrest. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
A Different View
Justice White, in a dissenting  judgment, 
concluded that the police officer, in 
placing  his head and hand into the 
accused’s vehicle and scanning  it with a 
flashlight, did conduct a search. “The fact 
determinative of this issue is not that the officer 
relied on the assistance of a flashlight to illuminate 
the otherwise dark interior of the vehicle,” he said, 
“but that, without permission, the officer physically 
placed himself inside the interior of the vehicle, a 
space where the [accused] had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.” Justice White continued:
A police officer is either outside the vehicle 
conducting a visual inspection, whether aided 
by a flashlight or not, or inside the vehicle to 
such extent that he can see items it would be 
impossible to see from outside and the public’s 
access to which the owner of the vehicle has 
sought to restrict. The degree of intrusion in the 
case at bar is no different in principle to the 
officer opening  the door and sitting  on the car 
seat. There is either an intrusion into the vehicle 
or there is not.  Here there was, resulting in a 
warrantless search. [para. 34]
This warrantless search, however, was justified on 
the basis of officer safety. “While the stated concerns 
for officer safety were rather vague and perhaps a 
different conclusion was available, considering  all of 
the circumstances and the law ..., I cannot say that 
the trial judge  made a palpable and overriding  error 
in finding  that officer safety was a concern,” said 
Justice White. “There was no ‘unreasonable’ search 
and, therefore, no violation of the [accused’s] 
section 8 rights for this reason alone.”
Justice White, unlike the majority, found the arrest to 
be unlawful because the officer did not objectively 
have reasonable grounds: 
My colleague references a number of loosely 
connected facts each of which is perhaps 
individually suspicious and somewhat indicative 
of the [accused] being  on occasion involved in 
unsavoury activities. However, the question on 
this appeal is whether, taken together, all of 
these facts could have reasonably and probably 
indicated to the officer that the [accused] had 
committed, was about to commit or was 
committing the offence of possessing a weapon 
for purposes dangerous to the public peace or 
for committing  an offence contrary to section 88
(1) of the Criminal Code.  In my view they do 
not. Simply put, the officer’s mere general 
knowledge that the [accused] had been 
previously arrested for drug offences and during 
that arrest was in possession of a knife, does not 
BY THE BOOK:
??????? Criminal Code
s. 495(1)(a) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence ...
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give the officer reasonable and probable grounds 
to arrest the [accused] for possessing a weapon 
for a purpose dangerous to the public peace on 
any subsequent occasion when the officer sees 
the [accused] with a knife. Otherwise a person 
in the position of the [accused] would always 
thereafter be at risk of arrest if he ever carried a 
knife again, even though possessing such a knife 
is not per se unlawful. This is especially so when 
there is no evidence the knife was used to 
commit any offence or used for dangerous 
purposes on either occasion.
A knife is not a prohibited or restricted weapon 
such as a gun. Unlike a gun, a knife is inherently 
a tool, not a weapon.  The fact of possessing a 
knife is not, without more, a criminal offence.  
While knives may be considered weapons 
within the meaning of section 2 of the Criminal 
Code with possession in some circumstances 
regulated by section 88(1), there is not a scintilla 
of evidence in this case that the [accused] had 
previously used the knife dangerously, that he 
was attempting to use the knife dangerously, that 
he was committing any offence with the knife or 
that he had any purpose dangerous to the public 
peace.  Even though it was nighttime, the 
[accused] was driving  alone in his vehicle, 
without exposing any other persons to the knife 
and he cooperated fully with the officer. I cannot 
conclude that a reasonable person would say 
that the officer had anything close to reasonable 
and probable grounds for arresting  the [accused] 
for possession of this knife.  [paras. 46-47] 
Since the  arrest was unlawful, it breached s. 9 of the 
Charter. The knife, seized as evidence of an offence 
incidental to the unlawful arrest, was sufficiently 
connected to the s. 9 breach such that s. 24(2)  was 
engaged. Justice White  would have excluded all of 
the evidence under s. 24(2)  and entered acquittals 
on the charges. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
?????????	 ?????
“You can only go as high on the leadership  ladder 
as your character will allow you.” - John C. 
Maxwell
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R. v. Shipley, 2015 ONCA 914
A uniformed police officer working 
nightshift in a high drug  trafficking 
area saw a car at 9:48 pm stopped 
diagonal to the marked parking  stalls 
in a bank parking  lot. The car’s interior 
lights were on and the driver was alone in the 
vehicle looking  down as if doing  something  on his 
lap. When the driver looked up and saw the officer, 
he appeared startled “like a deer caught in the 
headlights.” The officer did a u-turn to go back and 
speak to the driver. He wanted to determine if the 
accused was licensed and to investigate why he was 
in the empty bank parking  lot at night, parked 
strangely, with the interior lights on and why he 
would be startled upon seeing  the police. At the 
same time, the car left the parking  lot turning  in the 
opposite direction. The officer did another u-turn 
and followed the vehicle, entered the license 
number into his computer and learned it was a 
rental.
The officer pulled the car over and approached the 
driver, asking  to see a driver’s license and the 
vehicle’s documentation. The accused identified 
himself as Stephen Casey and told the officer he was 
licensed but did not have it with him. He was not 
able to produce any photo identification. When the 
officer ran the name provided on CPIC it came back 
as an alias to Stephen Shipley. Shipley was on bail 
for outstanding  drug  related offences. The computer 
entry  also produced a 4 x 4 photograph of Shipley. 
To confirm identity, the officer asked the accused to 
accompany him to his cruiser. When the accused 
complied and stepped out of his car, the officer 
noticed a number of plastic bags containing  a white 
substance on the  driver’s door and a further plastic 
bag  with a white rock in it on the  passenger seat. The 
accused was arrested for possessing  cocaine and he 
was patted down. Police found $450 in various 
pockets, $25 and a dime bag  of cocaine in his 
wallet, and a black cell phone. When the car was 
searched, police  recovered the plastic bags of 
cocaine from the front of the vehicle. A baby seat in 
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the rear had bags of cocaine partially hidden in the 
cloth portion of the seat. Police also found another 
cell phone, a digital scale with white residue on it, 
marijuana seeds and latex gloves. The drugs weighed 
35 grams. The accused was transported to the police 
station where he was strip  searched in a private area 
but no drugs were found on his person or in his 
clothes.  He was charged with possessing  cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking  and possessing 
proceeds of crime not exceeding $5,000.
Ontario Superior Court
The officer admitted in cross examination 
that a  rental car is often used in drug 
trafficking  and that drug  involvement by 
the driver was one of a number of 
possibilities going  through his mind when he 
decided to stop the vehicle and investigate further. 
The accused argued that the officer did not have 
grounds to stop  him, order him out of the car and 
then search the  vehicle. In his view, the stop  was 
clearly a ruse based on a hunch that drugs were 
involved. Since the vehicle stop was unlawful, so too 
were the searches of his car and person, and the 
strip search that followed. He submitted that any 
evidence found should be excluded under s.24(2)  of 
the Charter.
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to stop  the car under 
s.216(1) of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA), ask 
the accused to step  out to confirm his identity and 
determine whether he was licensed to drive. The 
cocaine was clearly visible when the accused 
opened the car door and the officer had every right 
to then arrest him and search the vehicle incidental 
to the arrest. As well, the officer needed to do a pat 
down search for safety reasons and strip search him 
later before he was placed in the general prison 
population.
The judge found the officer had a dual purpose in 
deciding  to stop  the accused. First, he wanted to 
make sure  the accused was properly licensed and, 
second, he wanted to know why he  was stopped in 
the bank parking  lot. He ruled that the stop was not 
a ruse and the inquiries made by the officer, 
including  the request that the accused step  out of his 
car, did not extend beyond the scope of s. 216(1) 
HTA: 
The officer, under these circumstances, was well 
justified in stopping  the [accused] under the 
H.T.A. to ensure he was properly licensed. There 
was nothing improper for the other reason for his 
stop which was to investigate why the [accused] 
was stopped at an empty bank parking lot at 
night, with interior lights on, in a high drug  area, 
and looking startled upon seeing the police.
I further conclude that the officer was justified in 
requesting that the [accused] step to his cruiser 
to determine his I.D. The [accused] did not have 
a license with him, contrary to the H.T.A. He 
was unable to produce any photo I.D. He was 
driving  a rented car. He had previously looked 
startled upon seeing the police. He gave a name 
which came up with an alias when searched on 
the officer’s computer. The officer had a picture 
on his computer screen and an individual a 
number of feet away in his car at night with 
lighting obviously not at its best. Under those 
circumstances I think it entirely reasonable for 
the officer to ask the [accused] to attend at his 
car to be able to do a proper photo comparison 
with the [accused] next to his photo on the 
computer screen.
Once the [accused] opened the door to his 
vehicle the drugs were clearly visible to the 
officer, both on the driver’s door and the 
passenger seat. The officer then had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] and search the 
vehicle. [2014 ONSC 4795, paras. 23-25]
As for the  strip search, it was properly conducted 
and was reasonable in the circumstances. It was not 
simply  being  done as a matter of routine. The 
accused had been arrested for drug  trafficking  and 
the purpose of the search was to discover illegal 
drugs secreted on his person. It was conducted in 
private at the police station by officers of the same 
gender with the accused removing  his own clothes. 
Further, as bail was to be opposed, the accused 
would be placed in the general prisoner population. 
The police  did not want hidden drugs smuggled into 
the jail. There were no Charter breaches and 
therefore no reason for a  s. 24(2) analysis. The 
accused was convicted of both charges. 
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that his ss. 
8  and 9 Charter rights had been 
breached. In his view, the  trial 
judge erred in finding  that the 
arresting  officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds to detain him and search inside  his vehicle. 
He submitted that the drugs found around the 
driver’s seat should have been excluded under s. 24
(2). The Court of Appeal, in a  short endorsement, 
rejected this argument:
We agree with the trial judge that the officer, in 
order to determine the [accused’s] identity, was 
justified in requesting that [he] step out of his car 
and come to the police cruiser. The [accused] 
did not have a licence with him as required by 
the HTA, and he was unable to produce any 
photo identification. The officer had a picture of 
the person whose name was the alias the 
[accused] had given him showing  on his 
computer screen in the police car. As a result, it 
was entirely reasonable for him to ask the 
[accused] to come over to the police car to 
compare the [accused] with the image on the 
computer screen to properly identify him for 
HTA purposes.
When the [accused] stepped out of his vehicle, 
the dime bags and rock of cocaine around the 
driver’s seat were in plain view. [paras. 4-5]
Relying  on Brown  v. Durham  Regional Police Force 
(1998), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), the Court of 
Appeal found the officer’s purpose in learning  what 
the accused was doing  in the bank parking  lot at the 
late hour was well within the ongoing  police duty to 
investigate criminal activity and did not taint the 
lawfulness of the s. 216(1) HTA stop.  There were no 
ss. 8 or 9 Charter breaches. The evidence was 
admissible and the accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Shipley, 2014 ONSC 4795.
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R. v. Phoummasak, 2016 ONCA 46
An undercover officer purchased 4.5 
grams of cocaine from a drug  dealer.  
Ten days later a second purchase was 
arranged but this time the dealer said 
he had to get the  cocaine from his 
supplier. He was observed enter apartment 428N at 
1169 Queen Street. He then rejoined the officer in a 
vehicle a few moments later and completed the 
sale. The dealer left the vehicle and returned to unit 
428N.  From this, police believed that the dealer’s 
supplier lived at, or was connected to, unit 428N. 
The lead investigator believed he had grounds after 
the second transaction to obtain a search warrant for 
unit 428N but he did not apply for one. Instead, he 
wanted “to confirm a  100% that this was the 
[supplier’s] address”.  Police planned for a third 
transaction with the dealer and would arrest him 
and anyone else there were reasonable grounds to 
believe was involved in the transaction. 
Police set up  surveillance in the area of the 
apartment building  on Queen Street. The plan was 
to apply for a warrant to search the apartment if the 
dealer went to unit 428N in connection with the 
third transaction.  An officer began working  on the 
necessary  paperwork for the warrant. As the third 
transaction began, the undercover officer drove the 
dealer to 1169 Queen Street. The dealer went inside 
the building  and returned to the vehicle about 10 
minutes later. He and the undercover officer drove a 
short distance away at which point the dealer 
produced 15.3  grams of cocaine.  The officer gave 
the dealer $800 and took the drugs. The dealer left 
the vehicle but, before he could be arrested as 
planned, he returned to 1169 Queen Street. He was 
then apprehended in front of the apartment building. 
His cell phone began to ring  repeatedly  immediately 
after he was arrested. The call display indicated that 
the calls were all coming  from someone named 
“Vic”, believed to be the supplier who police 
thought was in unit 428N. Worried that the supplier 
would become suspicious when the dealer did not 
answer his cell phone and would take steps to www.10-8.ca
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destroy any evidence relating  to the  drug 
transactions in the apartment, the police decided to 
enter the apartment immediately to “freeze” it until a 
search warrant could be obtained.
The police entered the apartment building  using  a 
fob  seized from the dealer, went to the door of unit 
428N and knocked. No one answered but the police 
heard noises coming  from inside. Using  a key seized 
from the dealer, the police entered the apartment 
and saw the accused coming  back into the 
apartment from the balcony.  A police officer outside 
the building  had seen the accused throw three 
baggies containing  drugs off the balcony. Police 
secured unit 428N, arrested the accused, and 
applied for and obtained a search warrant for the 
apartment. When the warrant was executed, police 
found various drugs and more than $5,000 in cash.     
Ontario Superior Court of Justice  
         
The accused argued that the search was 
unlawful and therefore breached s. 8  of 
the Charter.  He contended that the 
exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement under s. 11(7)  of the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA)  did not apply 
because  the po l i ce  c rea ted the ex igen t 
circumstances by their own operational decisions 
made in the course of the  ongoing  investigation. The 
judge rejected this submission. He found the police 
could not have obtained a search warrant after the 
second transaction and acted lawfully in entering 
and securing  the accused’s premises. Convictions on 
drug charges followed.  
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again argued that 
the police created the exigent 
circumstances upon which they 
relied to justify the warrantless 
entry  into his apartment. The Court of Appeal, 
however, disagreed. 
Exigent Circumstances
Justice Doherty, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
described exigent circumstances and their 
application to s. 11(7) of the CDSA this way:
Generally speaking, the police cannot enter a 
residence to search for evidence without prior 
judicial authorizations.  There are a few 
exceptions to that rule.  Section 11(7) of the 
CDSA recognizes the common law exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. It provides:
A peace officer may exercise any of the 
powers described in subsection (1), (5) or (6) 
without a warrant if the conditions for 
obtaining  a warrant exist but by reason of 
ex igen t c i rcums tances i t would be 
impracticable to obtain one. 
 
Section 11(7) of the CDSA, unlike other statutory 
provisions providing for exigent circumstances 
searches (e.g. Criminal Code s. 529.3), does not 
define exigent circumstances. In my view, the 
phrase has the same meaning  in s. 11(7) of the 
CDSA as it does in the Criminal Code provisions 
and at common law.  Exigent circumstances 
under s. 11(7) exist if (1) the police have grounds 
to obtain a search warrant under s. 11 of the 
CDSA (the probable cause requirement) and (2) 
the police believe, based on reasonable grounds, 
that there is imminent danger that evidence 
located in the premises will be destroyed or lost 
if the police do not enter and secure the 
p remises w i thou t de lay ( the u rgency 
requirement). [references omitted, paras. 11-12] 
In this case, the accused agreed that both conditions 
for a  warrantless search under s. 11(7) existed. 
However, he  argued that the  police manufactured 
the exigencies and therefore could not rely upon 
them to justify the search. In his view, the police had 
the necessary grounds to get a search warrant after 
the second drug  transaction. Instead, they chose to 
“Generally speaking, the police cannot 
enter a residence to search for evidence 
without prior judicial 
authorizations. There are a few 
exceptions to that rule. Section 11(7) of 
the CDSA recognizes the common law 
exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement.”
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proceed with a third transaction knowing  that their 
plan would place them outside the apartment door. 
They knew its occupant would then be suspicious 
once the dealer had not returned to the apartment 
and would take steps to destroy any evidence in the 
apartment. 
Although “the police cannot orchestrate exigent 
circumstances by creating  the  requisite urgency 
through a preplanned course of conduct,” Justice 
Doherty  concluded that was not what happened in 
this case. Even though the police  had grounds to 
obtain a  search warrant for the  accused’s apartment 
prior to the third drug  purchase, they did not 
anticipate that the investigative steps they took 
would create the urgency to justify an entry into the 
apartment without a warrant.  “The existence  of 
reasonable grounds to obtain a warrant does not 
preclude the existence of exigent circumstances,” 
said Justice Doherty.  “To the contrary, probable 
cause is a prerequisite to the existence of exigent 
circumstances.” He continued:
[E]vidence that the police had grounds to obtain 
a search warrant, but did not obtain a warrant 
and instead proceeded with other investigative 
measures, can in some situations afford evidence 
that the police set out to create exigent 
circumstances to justify entry into a premise 
without a warrant.  If that inference is drawn, the 
circumstances are not exigent and cannot justify 
a warrantless search or entry.
The inference that the police set out to avoid the 
warrant requirement does not flow automatically 
from the fact that the police could have obtained 
a search warrant for the premises before the 
exigent circumstances arose. The specific 
circumstances of each case must be examined.  
In this case, the officer in charge explained his 
reasons for not applying  for a warrant before the 
third drug transaction. That explanation was not 
unreasonable.  [The dealer] had made two sales 
to the undercover officer, one unconnected to 
unit 428N and the other connected to unit 
428N.  The officer in charge reasonably believed 
that it was prudent to seek further confirmation 
of the connection of the apartment to the drug 
transactions before seeking a warrant.   The 
reasonableness of the officer’s approach is 
evident from the trial judge’s opinion that the 
police did not have reasonable grounds to 
obtain a search warrant before the third 
transaction.  Although I disagree with her 
assessment, this difference of judicial opinion 
suggests that the officer’s decision to seek further 
confirmation of the connection between unit 
428N and the drug transactions before applying 
for a warrant was a reasonable one.  [paras. 
15-17]
In this case, neither the arrest in front of the 
apartment building  nor the unanswered telephone 
calls to the dealer were anticipated by the police. 
The police did not create “an artificial situation of 
urgency.”  The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“The existence of reasonable grounds 
to obtain a warrant does not preclude 
the existence of exigent circumstances.  
To the contrary, probable cause is a 
prerequisite to the existence of exigent 
circumstances.”
“[T]he police cannot orchestrate 
exigent circumstances by creating the 
requisite urgency through a preplanned 
course of conduct.”
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R. v. Fedan, 2016 BCCA 26
The accused lost control of his pick-
up  truck on a curve and struck  a large 
tree. Both of his passengers were 
killed. The area was lit by streetlights, 
the weather was overcast and the road 
was flat, dry and in good repair. Police attended the 
accident scene and seized his vehicle and stored it 
at a  towing  compound. Two days later the police 
obtained a warrant to search the vehicle for 
evidence such as blood, DNA, personal effects and 
documents to identify the driver. However, the 
search warrant did not specify the seizure and search 
of the sensing  diagnostic module (SDM)  and its data. 
The SDM is an electronic device capturing  the 
speed, throttle, and braking  of the vehicle in the five 
seconds before an airbag  event (eg. collision)  or 
near-deployment event (eg. sudden deceleration).
 
A police officer attended the towing  compound and 
removed the SDM which was embedded underneath 
the floor of the driver’s seat. He had not been 
involved in the preparation of, obtaining  or 
execution of the  search warrant. Data from the SDM 
was imaged with specialized equipment and 
revealed that in the five seconds before the accident 
the accused’s truck was travelling  106 km/h (over 
twice the speed limit). It had accelerated in the four 
seconds before the brakes were engaged, and the 
brakes were not applied until one second before the 
tree was hit. This data, along  with other evidence, 
resulted in several charges being  laid including  two 
counts of dangerous driving causing death.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge found the removal of the  SDM 
and the retrieval of its data did not 
breach s. 8  of the Charter. There was no 
evidence that the  accused was aware the 
SDM was embedded in his vehicle. Therefore, he did 
not have a subjective  expectation of privacy in the 
data. Without a subjective expectation of privacy, s. 
8  was not triggered. There was then no reason to 
consider whether there was an objective reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Further, even if there was a s. 
8  breach, the  judge would have admitted the 
evidence anyway under s. 24(2). The evidence 
proved the accused drove dangerously and he was 
convicted on two counts of dangerous driving 
causing death.
BC Court of Appeal
The accused argued the trial 
judge erred in not presuming  a 
subject ive expectat ion of 
privacy in the  SDM that was 
objectively reasonable. In his view, he had a 
presumed expectation of privacy in his vehicle 
which extended to the SDM, a component of it akin 
to an “onboard computer” or “black box”. He 
submitted that had not abandoned this privacy 
interest in the  accident, the data contained within it 
(precise speed, acceleration, and braking)  was not 
visible to the public eye and its seizure was intrusive 
since it was not easy to remove. 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued the trial judge 
made no error in finding  the accused did not have a 
subjective expectation of privacy in his vehicle. It 
was destroyed in the accident and was lawfully 
seized under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code. As well, 
the data captured by  the SDM only related to the use 
of the vehicle (speed, throttle and braking), was 
limited to a  five-second window before the crash, 
and did not record any intimate details of the 
accused’s biographical core, lifestyle or personal 
choices. Furthermore, even if there was a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the SDM and its data, the 
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Crown contended the expectation was not 
objectively reasonable. Any expectation of privacy in 
the vehicle had all but vanished when the vehicle 
was destroyed in the accident and was lawfully 
seized by the police in a criminal investigation. In 
addition, the SDM data would have been visible to 
any witness who had been present to observe the 
event. The data was highly relevant and reliable, did 
not expose any intimate details of the accused’s 
biographical core, lifestyle or personal choices, and 
its removal was not intrusive because the vehicle 
had already been destroyed. 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Section 8 of the Charter is only engaged if an 
accused can establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the subject matter of the search and/or 
seizure. This requires a subjective  expectation of 
privacy that is objectively reasonable. A subjective 
expectation of privacy requires a finding  that an 
individual had or was presumed to have had an 
expectation of privacy in the content of the subject 
matter of the search. As well, such privacy must be 
objectively  reasonable on the  totality of the 
circumstances considering  a number of factors. 
Section 8  protects privacy interests that are personal 
(bodily integrity), territorial (such as a home or 
vehicle)  and/or informational (personal information 
that may reveal intimate details about a person). 
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the vehicle 
had been lawfully seized without a warrant under s. 
489(2) of the Criminal Code  and stored in the towing 
compound. “In some circumstances, an item can be 
seized without a warrant,” said Justice Smith. 
“Section 489(2)  authorizes the seizure of any thing 
without a warrant where an officer in the  execution 
of his or her duties reasonably  believes that a thing: 
(i)  has been obtained by  the commission of an 
offence; (ii) has been used in the commission of an 
offence; or (iii) will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence. There must be an evidentiary basis to justify 
the use of the extended power to seize  under s. 489
(2)(a), (b)  or (c).” This lawful seizure  of the vehicle 
included the right to examine it and extinguished 
any privacy interest the accused may have had in the 
SDM and its data.
Although the accused could have been presumed to 
have a  subjective expectation of privacy in his 
vehicle, which extended to the SDM, this privacy 
interest was not objectively reasonable. “I am unable 
to see how [the accused] could have any residual 
territorial privacy interest in the SDM after the 
vehicle was lawfully seized or any informational 
privacy interest in the SDM data as, standing  alone, 
the data provided no personal identifiers that could 
link [the accused] to the captured data,” said Justice 
Smith. “He therefore had no reasonable  expectation 
of privacy in the SDM or its data after the vehicle 
was lawfully seized.” She continued:
[I]n this case, the data recovered by the SDM 
provided no personal information about [the 
accused]. The captured information pertained 
only to the use of the vehicle in a five-second 
window of time before a deployment or near-
deployment event. It did not capture any 
information that revealed intimate details of [the 
accused’s] biographical core, and in particular 
about who was driving the car. Further evidence 
had to be obtained to connect the driving of his 
vehicle to [the accused] himself. In my view, 
[the accused’s] informational privacy interests 
were not engaged by the downloading of the 
SDM data.
Nor do I accept [the accused’s] analogy between 
the SDM and a personal computer or a “black 
box” and therefore do not find the reasoning in 
Vu to be applicable. As noted, the data recorded 
by the device did not extend to personal 
identifiers of the driver of the vehicle. Most 
significantly it contained no intimate details of 
the driver’s biographical core, lifestyle or 
personal choices, or information that could be 
said to directly compromise his “dignity, 
integrity and autonomy”. [reference omitted, 
paras. 81-82]
And further:
Again, after undertaking  a normative assessment 
of the reasonableness of [the accused’s] privacy 
claim I find it difficult to see how an operator of 
a vehicle might be found to have reasonably 
intended the last five seconds of information 
pertaining to his or her driving before a collision 
to be private. Driving  on a public road is a 
highly regulated activity that is open to public 
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view, as evidenced by Mr. Schneider witnessing 
[the accused’s] erratic driving 20 minutes before 
the accident. Had another member of the public 
witnessed the collision, that person would have 
seen the information captured by the SDM, 
albeit with less accuracy.
...
In sum, in the context of this case and the 
totality of the circumstances, I find [the accused] 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the SDM and its data. His territorial privacy 
interest in the device was extinguished by the 
lawful seizure of the vehicle and he had no 
informational privacy interest in the SDM data as 
it contained no personal information linking him 
to the operation of the vehicle at the material 
time. [paras. 84-86]
There was no error in the trial judge’s finding  that the 
accused’s s. 8 Charter  right was not violated. And, 
even if there was a Charter breach, the trial judge 
did not err in admitting  the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The SDM and its data was properly admitted as 
evidence and the accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Folker, 2016 NLCA 1
On July 19, 2010 the accused reported 
to police that his common-law wife 
and mother of their infant son was 
missing. He said that she had left their 
home the previous evening  and had 
not returned. On July 23 he was contacted by  police 
for an interview, agreed to the request and drove 
himself to police headquarters the following 
morning. When he arrived, he was escorted to an 
interview room, asked to turn off his cell phone and 
told the interview would be video recorded. The 
interview lasted one hour and thirty-five minutes. It 
focussed on the events of July 18, personal 
circumstances, and information about the missing 
person’s habits, friends and use of their computer. 
The accused said that he had telephoned his wife’s 
friends and family the day following  her 
disappearance to find her but had not tried to call 
his wife on her cell phone since she had been 
missing. The accused voluntarily agreed to consent 
to a search of the home computer. A consent form 
was reviewed with him. It included advice that he 
had the rights to contact a  lawyer before signing  it 
and to refuse consent. It also contained an 
explanation that anything  obtained in the search 
could be retained as evidence and that the search 
could result in charges being  laid against him. The 
accused did not wish to contact a  lawyer and said 
he understood the potential repercussions of the 
search. During  the interview, the police advised the 
accused that they would want to verify the  truth of 
what he told them.  In this regard, the prospects of 
cell and home phone records searches, other 
searches and a future polygraph test were discussed. 
He stated he would agree to the searches and the 
polygraph. At the end of the interview, he said he 
wanted to cooperate with the police and that he 
“wanted her found.” At this time, surveillance of the 
accused was arranged. 
On July 27 the accused again went to police 
headquarters where he, and other members of the 
missing  woman’s family, met with police for an 
update on the progress of the investigation. After the 
meeting, police met with the accused alone for 10 
minutes to again discuss whether he would consent 
to searches of his cell phone records, their house 
phone and their vehicle. He agreed and was advised 
by police that they would prepare  the consent forms 
for those searches and meet him again the next day 
so he could sign them. The possibility of a polygraph 
examination was again discussed. The police 
wanted a polygraph done to know if the accused 
was responsible for his wife’s disappearance. He 
again stated that he would submit to a polygraph test 
and also allowed police to view his body to see if 
there  were any marks on it. This meeting  was audio-
taped.  
On July 28 the police met with the accused in an 
unmarked police car outside his place of 
employment for 12 minutes. They reviewed consent 
forms for searches of his cell phone, home phone 
and computer. Each consent form was explained and 
indicated that the accused had the right to consult 
with legal counsel about whether to consent, that he 
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was giving  his consent freely and voluntarily, and 
that he knew and understood that any evidence or 
information resulting  from the searches could be 
used against him in court proceedings. All consent 
forms were agreed to by  the accused. As a result of 
the statements the  accused made during  these 
interviews and other evidence, he was arrested and 
charged with murder.
Newfoundland Supreme Court
The judge ruled that the uncautioned and 
un-Chartered statements made by the 
accused to police on July 24, 27 and 28 
were admissible because he had not 
been detained when he gave them. The police were 
in the  early stages of a  missing  person investigation 
reported by the accused. There was no evidence of a 
crime being  committed and the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest anyone, including  the 
accused. He was asked to come to the police station 
for follow-up, came in his own vehicle and left after 
the interview on his own. As for the surveillance, it 
was set up to determine whether what the accused 
said was accurate. As well, the judge ruled that the 
statements had been given voluntarily. No threats, 
promises or inducements were made nor were  there 
any dirty police tricks. The accused was convicted of 
second degree murder. 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in admitting  the 
three statements he made, 
among  other things, because he 
was detained and ought to have been given his 
Charter rights before  providing  those statements. He 
claimed he felt compelled to cooperate with the 
police by answering  questions during  the  interviews. 
He asserted he was viewed as a suspect because the 
statements were videotaped and/or audio recorded 
and he was placed under surveillance. Thus, in his 
view, the statements should have been excluded 
under s. 24(2). As well, he submitted that the 
statements were obtained through police trickery 
and were therefore involuntary and inadmissible 
under the common law. 
Detention
Justice Hoegg  reviewed the Supreme Court of 
Canada jurisprudence on what constitutes a 
detention under the Charter. He made the following 
observations:
• A detention can be “physical or psychological” 
• A “psychological detention as arising  in two 
ways: 1) ‘a subject is legally required to comply 
with a police demand’ and 2)  ‘a reasonable 
person in the subject’s position feels obligated 
to comply with a police restrictive or coercive 
demand even though there is no legal 
requirement to do so’.” 
• “Not all encounters with police should be 
interpreted as psychological detention, and 
specifically  stated that information gathering  in 
a non-adversarial context lacks the essential 
character of a section 9 detention.”
• “An individual’s Charter rights are not engaged 
by cooperating  with police questioning  when 
police do not have specific grounds to connect 
that individual to the  commission of a  crime, 
even when it turns out that the individual being 
questioned is implicated in the crime”
• “An investigative  encounter has the potential to 
turn into a detention which would engage the 
requirement to give a detainee his or her 
Charter rights. Suspicion of a particular 
individual could trigger the requirement for 
Charter rights, but ‘focussed suspicion, in and 
of itself, does not turn [an] encounter into a 
detention. What matters is how the police, 
based on that suspicion, interacted with the 
subject’. In this regard, if the words and actions 
of the police are such that a reasonable person 
would conclude that he or she is not free to 
leave or decline to answer questions then the 
subject can be said to be detained.”
Recorded Statements?
The fact the accused’s statements were recorded 
during  the interviews did not necessarily render him 
a suspect and his interaction with the police  a 
detention:
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Video and audio recording of police interviews 
has become increasingly common in recent 
years, as the Judge noted. Such electronic 
records provide an accurate account of what 
actually transpires during a police interview, 
thereby providing reliable information for police 
use in their investigation as well as reliable 
evidence for possible later use. Electronic 
recordings of police interviews also protect other 
important interests. They serve as a strong 
deterrent to the use of improper police tactics 
and also help to protect police from spurious 
claims.  
In this case, [the accused] was advised that the 
interview on July 24 was being  videotaped and 
that the meetings of July 27 and 28 were being 
recorded. The statements he made in each of the 
July interviews were therefore made by him in 
the full knowledge that they were being 
recorded. Moreover, [the accused] was advised 
several times throughout the interviews that the 
police wanted to make sure that what he was 
telling  them was true.  In these circumstances, I 
cannot see how the video and/or audio 
recording of his statements supports his 
detention argument. [reference omitted, paras. 
21-22]
Compelled to Cooperate?
The majority also rejected the accused’s contention 
that he was detained because he felt compelled to 
cooperate  with the police. “While [the accused’s] 
subjective feelings in this regard are relevant, they 
do not determine that he was detained,” said Justice 
Hoegg. “The test set out in Grant is an objective one, 
requiring  that a reasonable person in the shoes of 
[the accused] would conclude that because of the 
police conduct he or she had no choice but to 
comply with the police questioning. Accordingly, 
the circumstances of the interviews, the nature of the 
police conduct and [the accused’s] personal 
circumstances must be considered.” In concluding 
that the accused was not detained during  any of the 
interviews, the majority stated:
[The accused’s] July statements are recordings of 
early police investigatory work in which [the 
accused’s] words can be fairly characterized to 
have been made in furtherance of his position 
that he did not know what happened to Ms. 
Shirran and that he wanted to help the police to 
find her. The police questioning  of [the accused], 
in these first of many interactions with him, was 
of a general nature, naturally touching  on his 
relationship with Ms. Shirran, possible reasons 
for her disappearance, and the efforts he made 
to contact her. In my view, the July 2010 
interview was a far cry from “focussed 
interrogation amounting  to detention”. There is 
nothing  in the evidence of the way the police 
interacted with him during the three July 
interviews that would cause a reasonable person 
in his shoes to believe that he or she had no 
choice but to answer the police questions. All in 
all, the circumstances giving  rise to [the 
accused’s] interviews with police in July, the 
nature of the police conduct and [the accused’s] 
personal circumstances do not support his 
contention that he was detained so as to engage 
his Charter rights. I conclude that the Judge did 
not err in determining that [the accused] was not 
detained when he gave those statements.  [para. 
29]
Voluntariness?
In determining  whether a statement is voluntary, a 
court must examine the confessions rule and 
consider four factors:
“Video and audio recording of police interviews has become increasingly common in 
recent years, as the Judge noted. Such electronic records provide an accurate account 
of what actually transpires during a police interview, thereby providing reliable 
information for police use in their investigation as well as reliable evidence for possible 
later use. Electronic recordings of police interviews also protect other important 
interests. They serve as a strong deterrent to the use of improper police tactics and also 
help to protect police from spurious claims.”
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1. threats and promises, 
2. oppression, 
3. operating mind and 
4. police trickery. This involves a distinct inquiry 
known as the “shock the community test.” 
In this case, the judge found there  were no threats or 
promises, physical contact or restraint by the police, 
harsh language or raised voices on anyone’s part, or 
police accusations or other police behaviour which 
could be interpreted as oppressive.  The accused was 
not vulnerable nor was there  any evidence that he 
did not have an operating  mind. As for police 
trickery, the police were honest and frank with the 
accused and told him several times they wanted to 
check out his story.  Although the police did not tell 
him he would be or was under surveillance, this did 
not cause him to answer police questions. The 
accused’s statements were voluntary and properly 
admitted.
 
A Second Opinion
  
Justice White, in dissent, disagreed with 
the majority that the accused had not 
been detained. In his view, the trial 
judge failed to properly apply the test for 
what constitutes a detention for the purposes of the 
Charter. Rather than applying  a  claimant-centered 
modified-objective test, he found the trial judge 
almost entirely focused on the perceptions and 
knowledge of the  police. Instead of asking  whether 
the police had reasonable and probable  grounds to 
believe the accused had committed an offence, the 
trial judge  should have determined whether the 
police had “zeroed in on the  individual as someone 
whose movements must be controlled” and whether 
the accused could have had a reasonable perception 
that he was detained. “The key is to determine ‘the 
line between general questioning  and focussed 
interrogation amounting  to detention’,” said Justice 
White. “While focussed suspicion is not on its own 
enough to establish detention, focussed suspicion 
combined with jeopardy for the accused, combined 
with something  more than a general inquiry from 
police, may be sufficient to give rise to the claimant’s 
reasonable perception that he or she is detained due 
to an implicit direction not to leave.”  
In this case, Justice White found the facts of the case 
led to the conclusion that the accused had been the 
subject of an investigative  detention in the 
circumstances:
• The police were investigating  what was a 
suspicious disappearance and a possible crime. 
• The police had a suspicion that the accused 
might be involved and had reasonable grounds 
for this suspicion. 
• The interviews were not general or preliminary; 
the police had clearly formed a theory and 
began to pursue it with the accused as a 
suspect.
• The police were engaging  in a focussed 
interrogation, with specific questions such that 
the police were clearly trying  to get an 
incriminating  statement or an admission of 
greater involvement from the accused. 
• The police  had decided to transfer the case to 
the major crimes unit and place the accused 
under surveillance. The several interviews 
during  which the police obtained consents for 
multiple searches of the accused’s property also 
indicated that the police  continued to have a 
keen interest in his actions.  
• The interviews were recorded and the accused 
was asked to turn off his cellphone. The 
interviews were not a  brief delay on the street 
and he was not directly told he could leave. He 
was told to ask  police before leaving  the room, 
for example to go to the bathroom, implying  a 
direction to stay put.
• The accused testified that he felt compelled to 
go to the police interview. 
Although the accused was detained, it was not 
unlawful. The police had reasonable and probable 
grounds to suspect that he was involved in an 
offence. However, the police failed to advise the 
accused of his s. 10 Charter rights upon detention. 
They should have told him of the reasons for his 
detention and about his right to counsel. Justice 
White would nevertheless admit the evidence under 
s. 24(2).  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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R. v Beauregard, 2016 ABCA 37 
The accused was arrested on a  warrant 
for robbery. Four masked and armed 
men had robbed a truck stop  about 3 
½ months earlier. The accused was 
read a standard Charter warning. 
When asked if he  wanted a lawyer he replied 
“Yeah”. He was transported to the police station 
where  he was placed in a telephone room with a list 
of about 20 local lawyers, the number for Legal Aid, 
and a phonebook. After about 5 minutes he was off 
the phone. The arresting  officer entered the room 
and asked if he was done. The accused said “yes”. 
The following  day, a police officer took the accused 
from his cell to an interview room. He was given a 
caution about not saying  anything  but nevertheless 
confirmed his involvement in the armed robbery 
during  the interview. This helped prove his identity 
as one of the robbers.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found that, during  his time in 
the telephone room, the accused had not 
talked to any lawyer but had called his 
mother. The arresting  officer never 
explicitly asked the accused if he had talked to a 
lawyer, nor had the accused advised he had not 
spoken to one. Although the police complied with 
the informational duties imposed under s. 10(b)  of 
the Charter, the  judge concluded that the police had 
breached the implementational duty. “If a police 
officer faces a detainee who diligently  but 
unsuccessfully seeks legal advice, he must obtain a 
clear, unequivocal waiver and provide what is 
known as a Prosper warning, or afford the detainee 
more time to contact a lawyer,” said the judge. “In 
my view the implementational duty is only satisfied 
if a reasonable period of time to contact a lawyer 
has been provided and before moving  to elicit 
evidence the officer confirms the detainee has been 
able to speak to a lawyer. A detainee who has been 
unable to reach a lawyer after five minutes, and who 
is asked by a police officer, ‘Are you done’, may well 
feel pressure  to wrap it up and may not have the 
fortitude to ask for more  time or may not realize  they 
are entitled to a  reasonable  opportunity to reach 
counsel, and more time if their initial attempts are 
unsuccessful.” As a  remedy for this Charter  breach, 
the judge excluded the accused’s statement under s. 
24(2). There was insufficient evidence to prove 
identity and the accused was acquitted.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquittal arguing  that 
the trial judge erred in finding  a 
s. 10(b) Charter violation. The 
Court of Appeal described the duties imposed on the 
police under s. 10(b) as follows:
Section 10(b) of the Charter confirms the right of 
any arrested person to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay, and to be informed of 
that right. As it expressly states, the section 
confers “informational rights” on the detained 
person; the police have a corresponding 
obligation to inform the detained person of the 
right to contact counsel and the availability of 
duty counsel. …
There are also “implementational duties” on the 
police. “These duties require the police to 
facilitate a reasonable opportunity for the 
detainee to contact counsel, and to refrain from 
questioning the detainee until that reasonable 
opportunity is provided. However, these 
obligations are contingent upon a detainee’s 
reasonable diligence in attempting to contact 
c o u n s e l . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e s e 
implementational duties only extend to 
providing a “reasonable opportunity” to consult 
counsel. There is no obligation on the police to 
guarantee or ensure that the detained person did 
in fact contact counsel. This is implicit in the 
finding that there is no constitutional obligation 
on the government to provide free duty counsel. 
[references omitted, paras. 13-14]
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the police 
sufficiently discharged their implementational 
duties. They placed the accused in a telephone room 
with the usual telephone numbers. The onus then 
shifted to the accused to make it clear that he had 
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not succeeded in contacting  counsel and wanted to 
have a further opportunity. Here, however, there was 
nothing  said by the  accused that he had not been 
able to contact counsel. There was no positive 
obligation on the police  to ask the accused if he had 
in fact contacted counsel: 
When the [accused] indicated he wished to talk 
to a lawyer, he was taken to the detachment and 
placed in a telephone room. The only reasonable 
inference is that the purpose of him being put in 
that room was to contact counsel. When [the 
arresting  officer] asked him if he was “done”, the 
only thing that question could have referred to 
was the “contacting  of counsel”. When the 
[accused] replied “Yup”, that answer could not 
reasonably be interpreted as being “No, I never 
contacted counsel”. The police are entitled to act 
on what the detained person tells them, analysed 
objectively. [reference omitted, para. 16]
Nor was this a situation where the accused waived 
his rights after asserting  them such that a subsequent 
Prosper warning  was required. “The [accused] 
specifically  said that he did want to contact counsel, 
he was given that opportunity, and when asked if he 
was finished he replied affirmatively,” said the Court 
of Appeal. “There  was no objective basis on which 
the police could be expected to take his actions and 
responses as a waiver of the right to contact counsel, 
and Prosper was not triggered.” Since there was no 
obligation on the police to positively ask if a 
detained person has been successful in contacting 
counsel, the accused had failed to discharge his 
burden in proving  a s. 10(b) breach. His statement 
obtained the next day was admissible  as evidence. 
Furthermore, even if there  was an implementational 
breach of s. 10(b), the statement was nonetheless 
admissible  under s. 24(2). Any breach was minor 
and done in good faith, the impact on the accused 
was minimal, and there was a  strong  public interest 
in prosecuting this violent crime.
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the acquittals 
were set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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R. v. Argent, 2016 ONCA 129
Two advertisements in the “casual 
encounters” section of Craigslist were 
posted by the accused seeking 
someone interested in smoking 
marijuana “and more”. The ads 
included photos of the accused’s genitals and he was 
also shown holding  a marijuana bud. The ad 
specified that he was looking  for a woman between 
the ages of 18 and 30 with whom he proposed to 
smoke marihuana and have sex. A male police 
detective in a  Child Pornography Unit pretended to 
be a 14-year-old-girl named “Carlee” and 
communicated electronically with the accused. The 
detective’s training  suggested that people who seek 
children will mention the age of 18  because 18 is 
the minimum age which Craigslist will publish in the 
personal erotic ads. 
“[Section 10(b) of the Charter] confers ‘informational rights’ on the detained person; the 
police have a corresponding obligation to inform the detained person of the right to 
contact counsel and the availability of duty counsel. … There are also “implementational 
duties” on the police. ‘These duties require the police to facilitate a reasonable 
opportunity for the detainee to contact counsel, and to refrain from questioning the 
detainee until that reasonable opportunity is provided. However, these obligations are 
contingent upon a detainee’s reasonable diligence in attempting to contact counsel’.”
“The police are entitled to act on what 
the detained person tells them, 
analysed objectively.”
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The detective’s first message in response  to the 
accused’s ad was:
Hey..cool pix! im not sure which is bigger…
the bud in your hand or your bud! lol!…
smoked for first time at my gr8  grad a  few 
weeks ago..yeah! lemme know when you r 
smokin again some time…luv to try again
“Carlee” then exchanged emails and messages with 
the accused which indicated she was a 14-year-old 
virgin in grade 8 and inexperienced with drugs and 
sex. The accused pursued the correspondence with 
talk of oral sex and condoms for vaginal sex.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused was convicted at trial of 
luring  a child under 16-years-old to 
engage in sexual activity but argued that 
the charge ought to have been stayed 
because  he was entrapped. He submitted that the 
police provided an opportunity for him to commit a 
crime under the guise of “Carlee” without either 
having  a reasonable suspicion he was already 
engaged in criminal activity or while making  a  bona 
fide inquiry. The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that the police did not provide him with 
an opportunity to commit an offence and, even if 
they did, they had a reasonable  suspicion to do so 
and/or were acting pursuant to a bona fide enquiry. 
The judge concluded that the police did provide the 
accused with the opportunity to commit the offence 
but the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect 
that he was already engaged in criminal activity 
when the opportunity was provided. As well, the 
judge ruled that the  police acted pursuant to a  bona 
fide inquiry  and did not induce the crime. The 
accused’s entrapment application was dismissed.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
officer did not have reasonable 
grounds from the outset to 
suspect that there was criminal 
activity going  on. In his view, his ad specified a 
woman of at least 18  years of age and this, on its 
own, did not provide a  sufficient basis for suspicion. 
He also submitted that the officer sexualized the 
communication by referring  to the “bud” in the first 
email and it was this response that manufactured the 
criminal activity and induced the crime.
The Court of Appeal rejected these submissions:
The police had reasonable grounds to suspect 
criminal activity when they viewed the ad as 
posted and as the conversation with the 
[accused] unfolded.
The ad included a photo of the [accused’s] penis 
and requested a smoking  partner “and more”. 
The police’s consideration of the use of the age 
18  as a flag for potential child abusers was 
reasonable. This was the lowest age that could 
be posted.
We do not agree that the officer manufactured 
the criminal activity by sexualizing the first 
communication. The photos had already done 
that. The communications from the officer made 
it clear from the outset that Carlee was 14, had 
just graduated from grade 8, was inexperienced 
sexually, and was under the watch of her 
mother. The questions posed by the officer were 
open-ended.  It was the [accused] who pursued 
the discussion of sexual activity. These facts 
support the officer’s suspicion that criminal 
activity was underway. [paras. 12-14]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“The police had reasonable grounds to 
suspect criminal activity when they 
viewed the ad as posted and as the 
conversation with the [accused]
unfolded.”
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R. v. Myette, 2016 SKCA 11
An officer received information from a 
confidential source that the accused 
and a  man named Sheldon Durocher 
were in a taxi cab  in Meadow Lake 
and they were in possession of crack 
cocaine. The source also said where the taxi was 
located. Seven minutes later the officer located the 
taxi near a bar in Meadow Lake. The officer 
confirmed that the accused and Sheldon Durocher 
were passengers in it. The officer followed the taxi 
for a short time, saw it travel to a grocery  store and 
stop, and then pulled it over after it drove away. 
The accused was in the front passenger seat. He was 
removed from the taxi and told he was under arrest 
for possessing  crack cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. He was searched and seven individually 
packaged pieces of crack cocaine were found in his 
jacket pocket. He also had some cash in his pants 
pocket and a cell phone. Another officer dealt with 
the other passenger.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
The accused alleged that his arrest 
amounted to an arbitrary detention under 
s. 9 of the Charter  and the search of his 
person incidental to that arrest was a s. 8 
breach. The judge found the accused had been 
unlawfully arrested because the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest him for trafficking. The 
informer’s tip was insufficient to objectively support 
a belief that the accused and his companion were 
intending to sell crack cocaine. The judge stated:
Instead of continuing to watch the taxi, [the 
arresting  officer] almost immediately arrested 
[the accused] for possession of cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking. Consequently, he arrested 
[the accused] only on what the confidential 
informant told him.  That very l imited 
information did not implicate [the accused] or 
his companion in drug  trafficking.  The 
constable’s surveillance did not reveal anything 
that could reasonably be construed as involving 
either of the men in drug trafficking.
 
Objectively, this information did not support the 
officer’s belief that [the accused] or his 
companion probably were intending to sell 
crack cocaine. For this reason I find that the 
officer did not have reasonable grounds to arrest 
[the accused] and that the arrest contravened 
[the accused’s] right to be free from arbitrary 
detention and imprisonment. [R. v. Myette, 2015 
SKPC 100, paras. 19-20]
The subsequent search as an incident to an unlawful 
arrest therefore breached s. 8  of the  Charter. The 
evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted of possession and possession 
for the purpose of trafficking.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s rulings arguing  that he 
failed to consider that the 
accused was arrestable for 
simple possession and this should have been 
considered in the s. 24(2) analysis. As well, the 
Crown suggested the trial judge erred in excluding 
the evidence.
Simple Possession Arrest
At trial, the evidence proceeded on the basis that the 
accused had been arrested for possessing  cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking  rather than simple 
possession. The Crown never suggested that the 
accused was arrestable for simple possession nor 
was the trial judge asked to consider whether the 
circumstances would have permitted such an arrest. 
Nor did the arresting  officer provide  any reason as to 
why the arrest was made for the more serious 
offence. Since this argument was not made at trial it 
was improper for the Court of Appeal Court to order 
a new trial on this basis. 
As for the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis, it was 
upheld. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
Editor’s note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Myette, 2015 SKPC 100.
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R. v. Vassell, 2015 ABCA 409
The accused was arrested along  with 
other individuals after a lengthy drug 
investigation. Cocaine had been found 
on top  of his driver’s licence in a 
drawer of a filing  cabinet in a  bedroom 
of a house  after a  search warrant was executed. He 
was arrested for possessing  cocaine at 17:41 hrs and 
advised of his right to counsel. He was again advised 
of his right to counsel at 21:44 hrs but was not able 
to speak to a lawyer until 02:45 hrs the following 
day, about nine hours after his arrest. At 20:56  hrs he 
appeared for a bail hearing, more than 24 hours 
after his arrest. He was charged with possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and possessing 
proceeds of crime over $5000. Then at 22:07 he was 
interviewed by police. This interview was audio/
video recorded. In the interview, the accused 
acknowledged that the residence where the  cocaine 
was found was his home and that the drawer in 
which the cocaine was found was in his room, but 
he denied knowledge of the cocaine. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused contended that his bail 
appearance more than 24 hours after his 
arrest breached s. 503  of the Criminal 
Code  and therefore his detention 
became arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter. He 
submitted that this arbitrary detention was 
connected to the interview such that it should have 
been excluded under s. 24(2). In addition, he 
suggested that he should have been re-advised of his 
right to counsel when he was informed at his bail 
hearing  that he was being  charged with possessing 
proceeds of crime. This, in his opinion, amounted to 
a “change in jeopardy” requiring  an additional s. 10
(b) advisement. 
The judge found that the police did not breach s. 
503  of the Criminal Code. They started the process of 
an appearance before a justice by faxing  the bail 
package within the 24-hour period. Even though the 
accused did not appear personally within the 24-
hour period, in the judge’s view, the police brought 
him before the justice of the peace both within a 
reasonable time and as soon as possible  under the 
circumstances. There was evidence that the justice of 
the peace had 14 other people ahead of the accused 
in this matter. Therefore, a justice was not 
immediately available and s. 503(1)(b) applied. As 
for the s. 10 (b)  re-advisement argument, the judge 
held there was nothing  in the new charge of 
possessing  proceeds of crime that amounted to a 
change in jeopardy requiring  a second interview 
with a lawyer. The accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing, among 
other things, that the audio/
video statement he made to 
police should not have been admitted as evidence. 
He suggested that that he was arbitrarily detained 
under s. 9 of the Charter because he did not appear 
before a justice within 24 hours of his arrest. As 
well, he asserted that his s. 10(b)  right to counsel 
was infringed because police did not re-advise him 
of his right to counsel when his jeopardy changed 
with the addition of the proceeds of crime charge.
Arbitrary Detention
A majority of the Court of Appeal found the trial 
judge did not err in concluding  that the accused was 
not arbitrary detained. “The police could not be said 
to have been acting  in a manner which ‘bears no 
relation to, or is inconsistent with’, the terms of s. 
503  of the Criminal Code,” said the majority. It 
continued:
[T]he degree of departure from s 503 could not 
be said to reach the level of arbitrariness. This 
case does not require an elaborate discussion of 
what it means when the framers of s 9 used 
“arbitrarily detained or imprisoned” and “la 
détention ou l’emprisonnement arbitraires” as 
compared to the words “illegally” and “illegales” 
which, of course, Parliament understood. Suffice 
it to say that the meaning  of “arbitrary” as a 
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feature of a principle of fundamental justice 
should be consistent in its Charter applications. 
Finally, there is no nexus between that defect, if 
any, and what the [accused] said to the police. 
Even if strict cause and effect is not required to 
be proven, there is no air of reality to the 
suggestion that somehow what the [accused] 
said to the interviewing officer had anything to 
do with the slight delay in his bail appearance. 
For a Charter submission, there must be 
evidence establishing  that the breach was linked 
to the evidence for which the exclusion is 
sought. [para. 30]
Right to Counsel
The majority also rejected the accused’s argument 
that he should have been re-advised of his right to 
counsel. “Nor are we persuaded that the  [accused’s] 
s 10(b)  rights were re-engaged when he was advised 
that he also faced a charge of being  in possession of 
the proceeds of crime,” said the majority. “This is not 
the type of change of jeopardy that warrants a 
further right to speak to counsel.” 
The majority dismissed the accused’s appeal.
Another Perspective
Justice O’Ferrall, unlike the majority, 
found the police did breach s. 9 of the 
Charter by not taking  the accused for a 
personal appearance before a justice 
until 27.5 hours after his arrest. “The Code requires 
that the attendance before a justice must be in 
person, although this can also occur by video link,” 
he said. But here, the police failed to do that. 
Further, since a justice was available by video link 
24-hours a day, it was possible for the police to bring 
the accused before a justice  within the 24-hour limit 
in s. 503(1)(a) and therefore s. 503(1)(b)  did not 
apply. “[Section 503(1)(b)] was not designed to 
allow institutional backlog  to interfere with a 
detainee’s right to be brought before a justice within 
a reasonable time of his arrest,” said Justice 
O’Ferrall. “The police in this case could have 
avoided the problems they faced at the last minute 
by bringing  the [accused] and his co-accused before 
the justice much earlier and seeking  an adjournment 
to allow the police further time to prepare the bail 
packages. In that circumstance, the court would still 
learn that the [accused] was in custody, even though 
the bail hearing  had been adjourned for a short 
time.” As for this rendering  the detention arbitrary 
under s. 9, Justice O’Ferrall stated:
Section 503(1)(a) imposes a positive legal 
obligation on police upon which the continued 
detention of an accused depends to remain 
lawful. A failure to comply with the section, 
therefore, means the detention is not “authorized 
by law” and “violates section 9.” Although my 
colleagues suggest a somewhat different test for 
arbitrariness…, a failure to comply with the 
section also amounts to arbitrariness under that 
test because it means the police have been 
acting in a manner that “bears no relation to, or 
is inconsistent with” the terms of section 503. 
Under both tests, therefore, the failure of the 
police to bring  the [accused] before a justice in 
accordance with subsection 503(1)(a) amounted 
to a breach of section 9 of the Charter. [para. 75]
As for a  s. 10(b)  breach, again Justice O’Ferrall 
dissented from the majority. In his view, the 
BY THE BOOK:
??????	 ??????	 ???????? Criminal Code
 s. 503(1) A peace officer who arrests a person 
with or without a warrant ... shall cause the 
person to be detained in custody and, in 
accordance with the following provisions, to be 
taken before a justice to be dealt with 
according to law:
(a) where a justice is available within a period of twenty-
four hours after the person has been arrested by or delivered 
to the peace officer, the person shall be taken before a 
justice without unreasonable delay and in any event within 
that period, and
(b) where a justice is not available within a period of 
twenty-four hours after the person has been arrested by or 
delivered to the peace officer, the person shall be taken 
before a justice as soon as possible ...
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accused’s s. 10(b)  rights were violated when he was 
not given the opportunity to consult with a lawyer at 
the time of the bail hearing  because there were two 
changes in his jeopardy: 
1. The addition  of the new charge for possessing 
the proceeds of crime.  “The charge here  was a 
separate charge, independent of the original 
charge of possession for the purpose of 
trafficking, for which there is a maximum 
penalty of 10 years in jail. If the accused was 
found guilty of both offences, therefore, the 
second charge would have the  potential of 
significantly increasing  his sentence. More 
importantly, however, with respect for the need 
to get further legal advice, the second charge 
was based upon different facts. This would affect 
what the [accused] might be inclined to say in 
any conversations with the police. In my view, 
therefore, there was a fundamental and discrete 
change in jeopardy once the police  decided to 
charge the [accused] with the second offence 
that gave right to a new opportunity to speak to 
counsel.” 
2. At the time of the bail hearing  his continuing 
detention was unlawful and arbitrary.  “An 
additional change in legal jeopardy occurred 
once 24 hours had passed without bringing  the 
[accused] before a justice. At this point, the 
[accused’s] detention became unlawful and 
arbitrary, giving  rise to a further right to speak 
with counsel.”
 
With regards to the accused’s statement, Justice 
O’Ferrall would have excluded it under s. 24(2)  and 
ordered a new trial if his decision to grant a stay of 
proceedings on other grounds was wrong. 
Complete case available at www.canli.org
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“Two things define you: Your patience when you 
have nothing and your attitude when you have 
everything.” - Unknown
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R. v. Nguyen, 2016 BCCA 32
After the accused was involved in an 
altercation at a  nightclub with another 
man, he  was held by nightclub staff on 
the street until police arrived. The 
attending  police  officer saw the 
accused in the middle  of the street struggling  to get 
away from two employees of the nightclub. When 
the officer ran up  to the men and asked what was 
going  on he was told the accused had likely hit 
someone on the head with a bottle inside the club. 
The officer yelled “police” in the accused’s ear 
“police” and told him to stop fighting. When he  did 
not do so, the officer handcuffed the accused for 
officer safety before  investigating  what had occurred. 
The officer was alone, there were many intoxicated 
people on the street and the accused was fighting 
with bar staff. He did not stop  fighting  after police 
arrived, and he appeared to be strong, very  angry 
and breathing heavily.
After handcuffing  the accused, the officer walked 
him to a safer location on the sidewalk. A woman 
approached and said, “My boyfriend was just 
protecting  me because a white  guy had touched my 
ass.” The accused then said, “Listen man some guy 
grabs your girl’s ass you’d knock him out too 
wouldn’t you?” The officer had not asked the 
accused any questions or engaged in discussion 
before the statement was made. Within two minutes 
of handcuffing  the accused, the officer formed 
reasonable grounds to believe he had assaulted 
someone and arrested him at 3:01  a.m. for assault 
with a weapon and assault causing  bodily harm . He 
gave the accused the ss. 10 (a)  and  (b) Charter 
warnings. The accused stated he understood and 
requested an opportunity to speak to a lawyer he 
named. 
The officer did not allow the accused to call counsel 
on a cell phone from the scene. The scene was not 
safe and privacy could not be provided. There were 
many people standing  nearby on the street and the 
accused could not be placed alone in the police 
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cruiser, which had no shield separator preventing 
access to the steering  system, the computer and the 
radio. Any call made from the scene would have to 
be brief and would likely be interrupted to permit 
the officer to manage the scene. As the officer began 
to write notes, the accused made another unelicited 
statement: “Listen, some fucking  fag  grabbed my 
girl’s ass, so I knocked the motherfucker out. Yeah, I 
did, big  fucking  white guy, out cold. He threw a 
punch. I laid him out. Yeah.” The accused was 
handed over to another officer at 3:10  am and re-
read the Charter warnings. He was then transported 
to the police station in a police wagon and was 
allowed to speak with his lawyer at 5:40 am.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused sought the exclusion of his 
statements under s. 24(2) of the Charter 
on the basis that this evidence was 
obtained in breach of his s. 10(a)  and (b) 
rights. He argued, among  other things, that the bar 
staff acted as agents of the police by exercising  a 
common law power of arrest and they should have 
advised him of his rights under the Charter 
immediately upon restraining  him. He also 
contended that he should have been advised of the 
reason for his detention by police and of his Charter 
rights immediately upon being  detained. Finally, he 
argued that his s. 10(b)  right was also breached by 
the delay in permitting  him access to counsel, which 
he submitted should have been provided 
immediately. 
The judge found the nightclub staff had only 
detained the accused for an investigation. He had 
not been arrested. “Detaining  the [accused] and 
turning  him over to police did not make [the 
employees] police delegates,” said the judge. “Given 
the finding  that they were not exercising  a common-
law power of arrest, nor acting  as state agents, they 
owed no Charter obligations to the [accused].” As 
for the  police action, the accused had been lawfully 
detained for investigation and there were exigent 
circumstances preventing  the Charter  warnings from 
being  given for a short period of time. Finally, the 
delay from the time the accused was arrested until 
he was given an opportunity to retain and instruct 
counsel was reasonable such that there was no s. 10
(b)  breach. “There was no reasonably available 
opportunity for the accused to make his phone call 
until he got to the station,” said the judge. “No self-
incriminating  evidence was elicited accidentally or 
intentionally between the time the accused 
expressed his desire to consult with a lawyer and the 
time his access to a lawyer was facilitated.” The 
statements made to the nightclub staff and the police 
officer were  admissible and the accused was 
convicted by a jury for aggravated assault. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions arguing  the judge 
made several errors in finding 
his statements to nightclub staff 
and the police officer were admissible. He again 
submitted, in part, that the nightclub employees 
were agents of the police such that they were 
required to inform him of his Charter rights. In his 
view, he was arrested when the employees did not 
let him walk away and held him at the scene until 
the police arrived. Therefore, he said he was entitled 
to his s. 10 rights. He also said his detention for 
safety reasons by police  required that he be given a 
Charter warning. As well, he contended that his 
s. 10(b)  Charter rights were breached when he was 
not provided with counsel on request.
Nightclub Staff as Police Agents?
Justice Willcock, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
upheld the trial judge’s ruling  that the police were 
not acting  as police agents and therefore were  not 
obligated to protect the  accused’s Charter  rights. 
Security staff involved in an investigative detention, 
prior to an arrest, do not have Charter obligations. 
Here, the nightclub  staff had not arrested the 
accused and therefore were  not required to inform 
him of his Charter rights.
s. 10(b) Charter
Everyone has the right on arrest or detention ...  
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay 
and to be informed of that right.
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Police Conduct at Scene
Justice Willcock also held the trial judge did not err 
in finding  that a Charter warning  was not required 
when the accused was first detained by police 
because  it was impracticable to do so in the 
circumstances. The judge found that exigent 
circumstances, some of which were of the  accused’s 
own making, prevented the warning  from being 
given for a short period of time. This was a factual 
finding  that the Appeal Court was not going  to 
interfere with. 
Delay in Accessing Counsel
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
argument that his Charter rights were breached by a 
long  delay in allowing  him to retain and instruct 
counsel:
The trial judge properly noted that the words 
“without delay” under s. 10(b) mean at “the first 
reasonably available opportunity” or “as soon as 
practicable”. She correctly recognized the police 
duty … to provide a detained person telephone 
access as soon as practicable, to reduce the 
possibility of accidental self-incrimination and to 
avoid eliciting evidence from the individual 
before access to counsel has been facilitated. 
Considering  the difficulty providing privacy to 
the [accused] in the circumstances, … she held 
“overheard consultations are not an adequate 
alternative to the right to counsel”. Her 
conclusion there had been no Charter breach 
occasioned by delay was based upon findings of 
fact … . [references omitted, para. 61] 
The statements made to the officer were not elicited 
by him. They were  made in an effort by the  accused 
to have the victim investigated for grabbing  his 
girlfriend’s “ass” and to explain why he had knocked 
out the victim. Moreover, even if there  were  s. 10 
breaches, the statements would not have  been 
excluded under s. 24(2). The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Kiene, 2015 ABCA 326
After the accused was involved in a 
motor vehicle accident and seriously 
injured, he was taken to the hospital 
by EMS. A police officer went to the 
hospital twice  to obtain a legislatively 
mandated collision statement from the accused as 
required by section 71 of Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act. 
During  the first attendance the accused was groggy 
and could not focus. The officer left at the accused’s 
request. A few days later the officer returned to the 
hospital in uniform and the accused completed the 
one page collision statement. The officer then asked 
the accused questions about the collision and 
recorded the questions and answers on the same 
collision statement form. When asked if he had had 
anything  to drink that night, the accused stated: “I 
remember having  2 beer.” At the end of their 
conversation the accused agreed to complete and 
sign a form consenting  to the release of his hospital 
records. 
When the officer reviewed the medical records a 
few weeks later, he discovered that the attending 
EMS members had smelled alcohol on the accused. 
He also learned that the accused had admitted to 
consuming  alcohol and a blood sample taken at the 
hospital just over one hour after the accident 
revealed a blood alcohol reading  of 216  mg%. A 
Production Order for the  hospital records was 
subsequently obtained. He was charged with 
impaired driving and over 80 mg% five months later.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer testified that he believed the 
accused was the victim in the accident 
and he had no suspicion and no grounds 
to charge him with anything. He did not 
inquire about the accused’s medication or mental 
state during  their conversation, and was not aware 
that the accused had undergone surgery two days 
earlier and received psychiatric counseling  the day 
of the interview. The accused appeared to be alert 
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and attentive and the officer did not perceive a 
power imbalance between the  two, nor did he 
conclude that the accused felt compelled to answer 
any questions. The officer did, however, inform the 
accused during  the second visit that it was early in 
the investigation and if there were  additional 
charges, those might be laid later.
The accused described the interaction as a “normal 
conversation” with the officer’s demeanor being 
pleasant and friendly. He testified that he  felt 
compelled to give a statement. He said signing  the 
form consenting  to the release of the records “was 
part of the investigation and was mandatory” even 
though he acknowledged that he wanted to provide 
a statement to aid in the investigation of the other 
driver in order to prevent the other driver from 
getting  “off the hook”. He testified that he  felt 
detained because the officer did not inform him of 
his rights and because the officer could stay as long 
as he wanted while the accused was confined to a 
hospital bed.
The judge accepted a  Crown concession that the 
accused’s s. 8  Charter right had been breached 
because  his consent was invalid since he was not 
aware of the potential consequences of providing 
the consent. However, the judge concluded that the 
accused had not been detained at the hospital such 
that he was entitled to a s. 10(b)  warning.  The judge 
found that the accused did not feel compelled to 
provide the information, nor did the requirement to 
provide an accident collision statement under the 
legislation impose any serious criminal liability 
sufficient to trigger a detention. Rather, the accused 
gave his statement because he felt it was his “moral 
duty” and because he wanted to assist the 
investigation. The hospital records were  admitted 
under s. 24(2) and a Crown blood alcohol expert 
opined that the accused’s blood alcohol level was 
between 184 mg% and 219 mg% at the time of the 
accident. He was convicted of impaired driving  and 
over 80 mg%. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred by 
finding  that his right to counsel 
had not been breached. In his view, he was 
psychologically detained while being  interviewed at 
the hospital which he was unable to leave. He 
submitted he felt compelled to give a statement 
because  the officer was in uniform, clearly signaled 
that the information sought was part of the larger 
investigation and that other charges could be 
brought. Further, his admission of having  “two beer” 
was an admission against his interests which would 
change the nature of the investigation.
A majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the trial 
judge’s ruling. With respect to detention and s. 10(b) 
it stated:
Section 10(b) Charter mandates that a person 
“has the right on arrest or detention ... to retain 
and instruct counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right; and ...”. The right does not 
crystalize until arrest or detention. In addition to 
its more obvious meanings, detention can 
include circumstances, objectively determined, 
“when police conduct would cause a reasonable 
person to conclude that he or she no longer had 
the freedom to choose whether or not to 
cooperate with the police”. [reference omitted, 
para. 24]
And further:
Psychological detention can occur where an 
individual has a legal obligation to comply with 
a request, or a reasonable person would 
conclude by reason of the State conduct that he 
or she had no choice but to comply. When there 
is no physical restraint or legal obligation, in 
order to determine whether a reasonable person 
in the individual’s circumstances would 
conclude a deprivation of liberty, the court may 
“Section 10(b) Charter mandates that a person ‘has the right on arrest or detention ... to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and ...’. The 
right does not crystalize until arrest or detention.”
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consider a number of factors including whether 
the police were making general inquiries 
regarding  a particular occurrence as opposed to 
singling out an individual for a focussed 
investigation. Among other factors are the nature 
of the police conduct and the place where the 
interaction occurred. [references omitted, para. 
28]
Although another court may have reached a different 
conclusion on the facts, the majority  found that the 
trial judge made no palpable and overriding  error in 
reaching  his conclusion and rejected the 
psychological detention argument for the following 
reasons:
• The only legally mandated information was the 
first page of the collision statement. The officer 
told the accused he was required to complete 
the collision statement. 
• There was no legal obligation to provide the 
consent to release medical information. The 
officer did not tell the accused that he had to 
sign the consent form. He merely asked him to 
sign it. 
• The accused had no questions about the form. 
• The accused testified that he wanted to assist the 
police and felt a moral duty to assist in the 
investigation of the other driver.
• The accused was not singled out for a focussed 
investigation. The officer was unaware that the 
medical information would reveal the blood 
alcohol content and at the time of obtaining  the 
consent, the police had no suspicion regarding 
the accused’s impairment. The medical consent 
was obtained in the context of a general 
investigation into the other driver.
• The officer’s demeanor was friendly and non-
adversarial, and the accused knew that he could 
ask the officer to leave as he had done so 
several days earlier.
The trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis was upheld and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
A Second Opinion
Justice O’Ferrall would have excluded 
the evidence under s. 24(2). In his view, 
the trial judge underestimated the 
seriousness of the Charter-infringing 
police conduct and the administration of justice 
would have been brought into disrepute by the 
admission of the evidence. He would have quashed 
the convictions and entered acquittals. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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R. v. Wong, 2015 ONCA 657
The police attended the accused’s 
apartment in response to her reporting 
her car stolen. A uniformed officer 
arrived, knocked on the door and 
entered. He noticed a  faint smell of 
marijuana smoke and asked whether there was a 
place they could talk. He was led to an island in the 
kitchen where he saw some “Zigzag” cigarette 
papers and a digital scale  on the counter. He knew 
these might be  drug-related but thought it odd that 
the accused would invite him into her home when 
there  was obvious evidence of marijuana use. As the 
discussion progressed, the officer asked for some 
documents and followed to help her look in a den 
for them. On the top  of the desk, in plain view, the 
officer saw two tin boxes with drug  markings, rolling 
papers and metal screen filters that he knew were 
commonly used to smoke marijuana. The officer 
decided to “call” the accused on the drug 
paraphernalia and said to her:
I need to talk to you about something. I’m 
starting to see a lot of stuff around your 
apartment pertaining  to marijuana and drug 
use. So, what’s going on here? 
“Psychological detention can occur 
where an individual has a legal 
obligation to comply with a request, or 
a reasonable person would conclude by 
reason of the State conduct that he or 
she had no choice but to comply.”  
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He told her she was not required to speak to him 
and let her know she could be arrested for 
possession. When he  told her this, she became 
fearful. The accused said the items belonged to her 
boyfriend and that she was not involved. He asked 
several questions about the items and eventually 
asked “What else is here that’s not yours, that’s your 
boyfriend’s.” In response, the accused pointed to a 
drawer under the desk and opened it. Three bags of 
marijuana, some identity cards and passports were 
observed. The officer reached into the drawer, seized 
the bags, and put them on the kitchen counter. The 
accused was again cautioned about speaking  and 
more questions were asked resulting  in the accused 
revealing  a duffle bag  on the floor beside a bed. The 
duffle bag  contained 15 packages of MDMA totaling 
11 kilograms. Two detectives arrived, arrested the 
accused, cautioned her and informed of her right to 
counsel. A search warrant was subsequently 
executed and police seized additional drugs, drug 
paraphernal ia , a semi-automat ic f i rearm, 
ammunition and various pieces of identification. 
Ontario Superior Court
The judge concluded that the accused 
had not been detained at any point 
before she revealed the contents of the 
drawer and identified the duffle  bag. 
Although she was responding  to the officer’s words 
and actions, it was her initiative to open the drawer. 
There was no compulsion of her by the officer’s 
words or conduct. Since there was no detention, s. 
10(b) was not triggered. The judge also ruled there 
was no search at that point because the accused 
voluntarily showed the officer the property of 
another and disclaimed any privacy  interest in it. 
And, even if there was a Charter breach, the judge 
would have admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). 
Finally, the judge found the accused’s statements to 
be voluntary. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that she 
had been psychologically 
detained when the officer 
alleged drug  use. The Crown, 
on the other hand, asserted there was no 
psychological detention because: (i) the officer made 
no “demand or direction” to her or otherwise 
restricted her liberty; (ii)  he was not focusing 
suspicion on her but on her boyfriend; (iii)  he 
cautioned her twice that she was not obliged to say 
anything; and (iv)  she  had the power to conclude the 
encounter at any time by asking  the officer to leave 
her home. In the Crown’s view, the officer believed 
he was speaking with a witness, not a suspect. 
Detention
Chief Justice Strathy, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, concluded that the accused had been 
detained before being  asked questions that led to the 
discovery of the drugs and other contraband. This 
detention occurred before the accused pointed out 
the drawer containing  the three bags of marijuana 
and before she identified the  duffle bag  in the 
bedroom. In his opinion, a reasonable person in the 
accused’s situation would conclude that she no 
longer had the freedom to choose whether or not to 
cooperate  with the police and had to comply with 
the requests. He found the trial judge did not apply 
the proper objective  test as required by R. v. Grant, 
2009 SCC 32. Chief Justice Strathy then conducted 
his own detention analysis:
The circumstances giving rise to the encounter: 
The encounter began as a consensual one, 
initiated by the [accused]. It soon shifted, 
however, into a drug-related investigation 
centred on her apartment. This would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that the officer was 
no longer addressing her as the victim of a car 
theft, but rather as a potential suspect in his drug 
investigation. 
The nature of the police conduct: The officer’s 
conduct became increasingly authoritative. He 
demanded an explanation for the presence of 
the drug paraphernalia: “So what’s going on 
here?” He challenged her explanation: if the 
“A reasonable person in the [accused’s] 
position, on being told that she could 
be arrested, would conclude that she 
was not free to go.”
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scale was for baking, where were her supplies? 
He told her that she was in possession of the 
drug paraphernalia and that he could arrest her. 
As in Grant, the officer took control of the 
[accused] and sought to obtain information from 
her. 
The characteristics and circumstances of the 
[accused]: The [accused] was an apparently 
naïve young  woman. She was alone, in her small 
apartment, with a uniformed police officer who 
was undertaking  a drug  investigation. She told 
the officer she was frightened, as she 
undoubtedly was. As in Grant, the encounter, as 
it developed, was inherently intimidating.
In my view, the [accused] was detained when, in 
furtherance of his drug investigation, the officer 
told her that he could arrest her based on the 
possession of drug paraphernalia and asked her 
for an explanation. A reasonable person in the 
[accused’s] position, on being  told that she 
could be arrested, would conclude that she was 
not free to go. [paras. 45-49]
Since the accused was detained and was not advised 
of her right to counsel, her s. 10(b) Charter right was 
breached:
The officer did not inform the [accused] of her 
right to counsel when he began to question her 
for his drug investigation, or at any time before 
her arrest. He did inform her of her right to 
silence, a right closely related to the right to 
counsel. At the same time, however, he made it 
clear to the [accused] that he was looking for her 
cooperation. He suggested that the best way out 
of her predicament was to provide an 
explanation for the drug-related paraphernalia 
and, later, to direct him to her boyfriend’s 
contraband.
The officer encouraged the [accused] to 
incriminate herself by demonstrating  knowledge 
of the presence and location of the contraband, 
without advising  her of her right to speak to a 
lawyer. This goes to the very heart of the 
principle underlying s. 10(b). The [accused] had 
a right to remain silent unless and until she 
made an informed decision to waive that right 
and to provide the requested information to the 
police. By failing to comply with s. 10(b), the 
officer prevented her from making that informed 
decision.  [references omitted, paras. 51-52] 
The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2). The 
Court of Appeal found the Charter-infringing 
conduct to be serious. Although the breaches were 
not deliberate, the officer failed to appreciate the 
significance of the encounter, the accused’s Charter 
rights and the accompanying  police  obligations. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, the convictions set 
aside and acquittals entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. Rowson, 2015 ABCA 354
The accused proceeded into an 
intersection from a secondary  road 
and struck the passenger side of a 
vehicle travelling  on a major highway. 
Three passengers in the other vehicle 
were seriously injured. Police arrived on scene at 
9:07 pm. The accused said he had stopped at the 
stop  sign but thought he had time to make it. He 
claimed he had not been drinking  and did not need 
any medical attention. At 9:18  pm a police officer 
placed him in the  back seat of her police car and 
closed the door. She wanted to make sure  the 
accused was safe. The scene was chaotic and there 
was an air ambulance arriving. At 9:23  a second 
officer at scene saw the accused speaking  on his cell 
phone. He told the accused to hang  up  the phone 
and advised him that he was under investigative 
detention “in relation to the accident,” but did not 
tell him about his right to counsel. 
At 9:20 pm, a third officer spoke with the accused in 
the back of the police vehicle and noticed the smell 
of fresh chewing  gum. He told the accused to spit 
out his gum and blow air in his direction. The 
accused made a “fake  blow,” puffing  up his cheeks 
but not exhaling  any air. At 9:37 pm the officer 
returned to the police vehicle and saw the accused 
using  his cell phone again, claiming  he was texting  a 
friend. At this point, the accused was arrested for 
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dangerous driving  and “possibly impaired driving” 
and his cellphone was seized. The officer included 
“possibly impaired driving” because he wanted the 
accused to know that he was still investigating  him 
for it. The accused was advised of his right to 
counsel, searched and placed in the back of another 
police vehicle. The accused said he wanted to 
contact counsel, but the officer told him that he 
could not contact a lawyer at that time due to 
privacy concerns. 
At 9:50 pm a fourth officer opened the police car 
door, asked a few questions but could not smell any 
alcohol. At 10:13  pm the accused was transported to 
the police station where he  was re-cautioned and 
asked if he  understood. When he said “Yes, sir”, the 
officer smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath. 
After the  accused spoke to legal aid, a roadside 
screening  demand was made and the accused failed. 
The breath demand followed as did an unsuccessful 
attempt to contact a lawyer. The accused provided 
breath samples resulting  in readings of 110 mg% 
and 100 mg%. He was subsequently  charged with 
impaired driving  and dangerous driving  causing 
bodily harm and over 80 mg%.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued several Charter 
breaches including  an arbitrary detention 
by the first officer at the scene of the 
collision, an unlawful investigative 
detention by the second officer without the requisite 
grounds, and an unlawful arrest by the third officer 
without sufficient cause to do so. The judge did find 
several Charter breaches, including  an arbitrary 
detention under s. 9 when the first officer placed 
him in the back seat of the locked police car and 
failed to advise him of anything  other than to stay 
put. However, he held the investigative detention by 
the second officer lawful. “The evidence on the 
whole  supports the fact that [the second officer] had 
reasonable grounds to suspect that [the accused] 
was connected to a particular crime and that such 
detention was necessary when he placed him under 
investigative detention and prevented him from 
using  his cell phone,” said the judge. As for the 
arrest, it too was lawful. “The evidence on a whole 
supports the fact that [the third officer] had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest [the 
accused] for dangerous driving,” said the judge. The 
breath results were admitted under s. 24(2)  and the 
accused was convicted of impaired and dangerous 
driving causing bodily harm.  
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
made and error in not finding  a 
continuous arbitrary detention 
that began with the initial unlawful detention and 
carried through the investigative detention and 
arrest, rendering  them all unlawful. In his view, the 
initial arbitrary detention could not be remedied. 
Once the judge found the accused had been 
arbitrary  detained when placed in the back of the 
police car, the later investigative detention by the 
second officer and the  arrest by the third officer 
were not lawful. 
 
Continuous Detention
Justice O’Ferrall concluded that the judge did not err 
in failing  to find to one continuous arbitrary 
detention following the initial arbitrary detention:
I fail to understand how an initial arbitrary 
detention can render subsequent lawful 
detentions arbitrary. In our view, the arbitrary 
part of the [accused’s] detention (i.e., the part 
not authorized by law; or authorized by law, but 
not Charter-compliant) came to an end the 
instant the police had a reasonable suspicion 
that the [accused] may have committed the 
offence of dangerous driving. And the police had 
that suspicion very early in the investigation. So 
the arbitrary detention, in our view, was of short 
duration.
The trial judge found that the [accused] was 
arbitrarily detained when he was placed in the 
back of the police car by [the first officer]. The 
Crown does not contest that finding. But I reject 
the argument that when the second constable … 
placed the [accused] under investigative 
detention a mere 10 minutes after he had been 
placed in the police vehicle by [the first officer], 
he had no grounds to do so. At that point in time 
there were grounds to suspect that the [accused] 
may have been guilty of at least a stop sign 
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violation or failing to proceed in safety which 
would have required the preparation of a 
summons. The [accused’s] own pre-detention 
admission that he thought he could make it 
across even two lanes of this divided highway 
disclosed grounds for a reasonable belief that a 
more serious offence had occurred, namely 
dangerous driving.
The [accused] also argues that [he] was never 
relieved from the initial arbitrary detention and 
that therefore the arbitrary detention continued 
notwithstanding  that reasonable grounds for 
detaining  [him] may have subsequently 
emerged. I reject that argument. What were the 
police to do? Tell the [accused] in one breath 
that he was free to go, thereby relieving  him of 
the arbitrary detention, and in the next breath 
advise him that he was being  detained while the 
police investigated their reasonable suspicion 
that [he] had committed a driving offence which 
may have caused serious injuries to two women 
in a car which appeared to have the right of 
way? The [accused] was not free to go. 
Irrespective of the possibility of offences having 
been committed, the [accused] was required to 
remain at the scene. [paras. 22-24]
As for the legality of the accused’s arrest, Justice 
O’Ferrall found it too was lawful:
Within 20 minutes of [the second officer] 
informing  the [accused] that he was under 
investigative detention, [the third officer] placed 
the [accused] under arrest. [The arresting officer] 
seized the [accused’s] cellphone, placed him in 
the back seat of his police vehicle, told him he 
was being arrested for dangerous driving  and 
possibly impaired driving and advised him of his 
right to counsel.
The [accused] argues that the trial judge erred in 
finding that the police had grounds to arrest the 
[him]. The Crown, in its factum, listed eight 
pieces of information which [the arresting 
officer] attested formed the basis for his belief 
that the [accused] may have committed the 
indictable offence of dangerous driving. In short, 
the circumstances of the accident and the road 
conditions were such that it was both 
subjectively and objectively reasonable to 
believe that the [accused] might have committed 
the offence of dangerous driving. … [paras. 
25-26]
The trial judge did not err in admitting  the 
breathalyzer tests under s. 24(2)  and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
A Second Opinion
Justice Martin, writing  his own decision, 
also dismissed the appeal on the s. 24(2) 
basis, but also commented on the 
lawfulness of the arrest:
I wish to add that I do not agree with the 
[accused] that there were no grounds to detain 
or arrest him at the scene of the accident. The 
[accused] was the driver of a half-ton truck that 
attempted to cross a major, much travelled, four-
lane highway from a secondary road. That 
evening  the roads were dry and clear, visibility 
was unimpeded and all oncoming traffic was 
travelling with headlights on. The posted speed 
limit on the major highway was 90 km/hour, and 
it appears traffic was travelling  at approximately 
that speed. The [accused] advised that he 
stopped before attempting  to cross the highway 
as required by the stop sign facing him. He told 
the first responding  police officers that he 
proceeded because, "I thought I had time to 
make it.”
A Third View
Justice Veldhuis took a different view 
than her colleagues on the legality of the 
accused’s arrest. There  were no grounds 
to arrest him for dangerous driving. The 
grounds accepted by the trial judge were mostly 
neutral and could not ground an arrest for dangerous 
driving. “The fact that the accident was serious did 
not give the officer any information about whether 
the driving  that caused it was criminal, nor did the 
location of the driver of the truck, the time of day, 
the speed limit at that portion of the roadway or the 
fact that 22X is a busy roadway,” she said. Since the 
accused’s arrest was unlawful, it was arbitrary and 
was never cured. This significantly impacted the trial 
judge’s s. 24(2)  analysis. Justice Veldhuis would have 
allowed the appeal, excluded the breath tests, set 
aside the convictions and acquitted the accused. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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On-duty peace officer deaths in 
Canada decreased by two last year 
over 2014. In 2015 three peace 
officers lost their lives on the job  as 
reported by the Officer Down 
Memorial Page. 
Guns, once again, posed the greatest risk to officers 
last year. Since 2006, 13 officers have lost their lives 
to gunfire. However, circumstances involving 
vehicles, including  automobile accidents (15), 
vehicular assault (5) and being  struck by  a vehicle 
(2), posed the most risk to officers over the last 
decade. These deaths account for nearly half (49%) 
of all on-duty deaths, which is much higher than the 
next leading  cause of gunfire (29%) in the same 10 
year period. On average, nine officers have lost their 
lives every two years during  the last decade, while 
2010 had the most deaths at seven. 
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2015 Average Tour: 5 years 8 months
2015 Average Age: 39
2015 Deaths by Gender: female - 0
    male - 3
2015 Deaths by Province:
✴ Alberta - 2
✴ British Columbia - 1
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2015 Deaths by Cause:
✴ gunfire - 1
✴ heart attack - 1
✴ automobile accident - 1
Last 10 years by Gender: 
✴ female - 6
✴ male - 39
“They Are Our Heroes. 
We Shall Not 
Forget Them.”
Source: http://canada.odmp.org [accessed February 13, 2016]
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by cause & year)
Cause 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Total
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 1 15
Drowned 1 1 2
Duty related illness 1 1
Gunfire 2 3 1 1 3 3 13
Heart attack 1 1 2
Natural disaster 2 2
Stabbed 1 1
Struck by vehicle 1 1 2
Training accident 1 1
Vehicular assault 1 2 1 1 5
Total 3 5 6 5 3 7 4 2 4 6 45
Female 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 6
Male 3 4 5 4 3 6 3 2 4 5 39
?????	 ???????	 ????????
According  to a Statistics Canada report, “Police-
reported crime statistics in  Canada, 2014,” 
assaulting  a peace officer dropped (-5%)  from 2013 
to 2014. In 2014 there were 9,450 assault peace 
officer offences compared to 9,826 the previous 
year. From 2004 to 2014, the  assault against peace 
officer rate has dropped (-7%). 
For other assaults in 2014, there were:
• 153,352 reports of common assault (level 1).
➡ down 5% from 2013.
• 44,788 assaults with a weapon or bodily harm 
(level 2).
➡  down 4% from 2013.
• 3,242 offences of aggravated assault (level 3). 
➡ down -1% from 2013.
13%
87%
On-Duty Deaths 2006-2015 by Gender
Male
Female
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2014”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 22, 2015.
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U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause 2015 2014
911 related illness 6 7
Accidental 2 -
Aircraft accident 1 -
Assault 3 2
Automobile accident 28 27
Bomb 6 -
Drowned - 2
Duty related illness 2 3
Fall 1 -
Fire - 1
Gunfire 39 47
Gunfire (accidental) 2 2
Heart attack 18 18
Motorcycle accident 4 4
Struck by vehicle 5 5
Vehicle pursuit 5 5
Vehicular assault 8 10
Total 130 133
U.S. On-Duty Deaths by Year (2005-2014)
Year 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Total
Deaths 130 133 120 134 180 177 140 161 204 161 1540
Avg. age 40 41 43 42 41 42 40 40 40 38
Avg. tour 12 yrs.
6 mos.
12 yrs.
10 mos.
14 yrs.
5 mos.
12 yrs.
8 mos.
13 yrs.
7 mos.
12 yrs.
2 mos.
11 yrs.
11 mos.
11 yrs.
12 mos.
11 yrs.
5 mos.
11 yrs.
5 mos.
Female 10 4 7 12 12 10 3 16 9 9 92
Male 120 129 113 122 168 167 137 145 195 152 1448
U.S. ON-DUTY DEATHS RISE
During  2015 the U.S. lost 130 
peace officers, down three from 
2014. The top cause of death 
was gunfire (39) followed by 
automobile accidents (28), heart 
attack (18), vehicular assault (8), 
911 related illness (6), and 
bombs (6).  
Texas lost the most officers in 2015 at 13  - followed by Georgia 
(10), Louisiana, New York and the U.S. Government at nine each, 
California (5), Kentucky (5), 
Mississippi (5), Pennsylvania 
(5), Alabama (4), Colorado (4), 
New Jersey  (4), Puerto Rico (4) 
and Tennessee (4). The average 
age  of deceased officers was 
40 years while the average 
tour of duty was 12 years and 
six months. Men accounted 
for 92% of U.S. officer deaths 
while women made up 8%. 
Female
8%
Male
92%
Source: http://www.odmp.org/year.php [accessed February 13, 2016]
“It Is Not How These Officers Died 
That Made Them Heroes. 
It Is How They Lived.”
Inscription at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C.
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